refactor(maestro): drop allow_inbound policy gate, keep JWT session binding (NAP-339)
The peer (T2) attach path had a per-pair access-control layer (`[daemon.policy].allow_inbound`): a target-side allow-list of daemon ids permitted to broker-attach, enforced inside JWT verification, hot-reloadable via SIGHUP / `POST /api/policy/reload`, with a `maestro policy` CLI. On a flat-trust perimeter (the operator's VPN/firewall is the boundary for which hosts connect) that granularity is unused, and deny-by-default made it config friction — cross-daemon attach silently failed until every peer was listed. Remove the allow-list; keep the registry-minted pair-attach JWT and ALL its binding checks (iss=registry, aud=target, sid=session, exp). The firewall gates host->port reachability; it does not stop a reachable host from attaching to a session it wasn't handed or replaying a token elsewhere — that's the JWT's job and it stays. Only the `sub in allow_inbound` check is dropped. Removed: DaemonPolicySection / [daemon.policy].allow_inbound (config + daemon), policy.rs (SIGHUP listener + GET/POST /api/policy), the `maestro policy` CLI, PairAttachVerifier's allow-list field/reload/snapshot + JwtError::NotAllowed, and the e2e broker_rejects_when_target_doesnt_allow_inbound test. The NAP-265 pre-upgrade-502 path stays covered by broker_attach_returns_502_on_perimeter_mismatch. Also dropped the unit's ExecReload=kill -HUP: with no SIGHUP handler left, default SIGHUP disposition is terminate, so wiring `systemctl reload` to it would kill the daemon. Re-introducing a per-pair gate later is a verify-time change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ pub mod cli;
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pub mod config;
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pub mod dispatch;
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pub mod http;
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pub mod policy;
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pub mod sessions;
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pub use dispatch::{dispatch, CliError};
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